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International Aid and the Scope 
of Kindness* 
Garrett Cullity 
It is now over twenty years since Peter Singer's "Famine, Affluence and 
Morality" stimulated philosophical discussion of whether affluence is 
immoral in a world where there is starvation.' However, there has for 
some time been little direct philosophical discussion of the question 
whether affluent individuals have nonderivative moral responsibilities 
toward the starving, despite the depressing fact that the misery which 
prompted Singer to write is no less prevalent today.2 The explanation 
* Successive versions of this article have benefited greatly from the comments of 
Berys Gaut, Jonathan Glover, James Griffin, Onora O'Neill, Derek Parfit, and Bernard 
Williams, to whom I express my thanks. I am also grateful to Alan Ryan and two 
anonymous readers for Ethics. 
1. Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence and Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 
(1972): 229-43. Several collections of philosophical treatments of the same question 
appeared in the mid-1970s: William Aiken and Hugh LaFollette, eds., World Hunger 
and Moral Obligation (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1977); Peter Brown and 
Henry Shue, eds., Food Policy: The Responsibility of the United States in Life and Death Choices 
(New York: Free Press, 1977); George R. Lucas and Thomas Ogletree, eds., Lifeboat 
Ethics: The Moral Dilemmas of World Hunger (New York: Harper & Row, 1976). For 
Singer's other presentations of argument, see "Postscript to 'Famine, Affluence and 
Morality,"' in Aiken and LaFollette, eds., pp. 33-36, "Reconsidering the Famine Relief 
Argument," in Brown and Shue, eds., pp. 36-53, and Practical Ethics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), chap. 8. 
2. There are some exceptions: Susan James, "The Duty to Relieve Suffering," 
Ethics 93 (1982): 4-21; L. J. Cohen, "Who Is Starving Whom?" Theoria 47 (1981): 
65-81; Jonathan Bennett, "Our Neglect of the Starving: Is It as Bad as Murder?" in 
The Tanner Lectures of Human Values, ed. S. McMurrin (Salt Lake City: University of 
Utah Press, 1982), vol. 2, pp. 72-95; Douglas Odegard, "Charity and Moral Impera- 
tives," Theoria 55 (1989): 81-94; John M. Whelan, Jr., "Famine and Charity," Southern 
Journal of Philosophy 29 (1991): 149-66.To be contrasted with this is the recent work on 
internationaljustice in relation to institutions (since many individuals have obligations in 
relation to the institutions in question, derivative individual obligations follow). See 
Onora O'Neill, Faces of Hunger (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986); P. Alston and K. 
Tomasevski, eds., The Right to Food (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1984); Stanley Hoffman, Duties 
beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics (Syracuse, N.Y.: 
Ethics 105 (October 1994): 99-127 
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100 Ethics October 1994 
of this silence seems to have two different sources. Some philosophers 
appear to believe that Singer's argument has definitively established 
his two conclusions-the strong one that affluent people's not contrib- 
uting money or time to voluntary international aid agencies is immo- 
ral,3 in the same way that a bystander's failing to save a drowning child 
would be immoral, and the stronger one that noncontribution to such 
agencies only ceases to be wrong when one has reduced oneself to a 
level such that any further sacrifice would actually be worse for those 
whom one is trying to help.4 The larger part of the explanation, 
though, surely resides in the more widespread view that Singer's con- 
clusions only follow from some robust and contentious consequen- 
tialist assumptions, in contradiction to his own claim that his argument 
should be acceptable to consequentialists and nonconsequentialists 
alike.5 Indeed, to many people it appears that progress in answering 
this practical moral question, as with many others, can only be made 
by first addressing the much larger task of defending one normative 
moral theory against its rivals. It will be my concern to show that both 
of these beliefs are false: Singer's own argument is unsuccessful, but 
a better argument supports his first conclusion, and perhaps his second 
as well. 
In contrast, a topic which has received considerable recent atten- 
tion from moral philosophers is that of the demandingness of morality. 
Could it be the case that in order to be living a morally perfect life, 
Syracuse University Press, 1981); and Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence 
and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980). There is, of 
course, an extensive nonphilosophical literature on food and development policy. 
3. In what follows, I shall often refer to voluntary international aid agencies simply 
as "aid agencies." However, the claim to be examined is that it is wrong not to be 
contributing to international aid in a purely private and voluntary capacity, over and 
above the contributions which one may be making as a taxpayer to the aid programs 
of one's government and international institutions. I shall not be able to address here 
the question whether famine relief agencies are the only such agencies to which the 
arguments of this article applies. 
4. For the two conclusions, see Singer, "Famine, Affluence and Morality," pp. 230, 
241-42. For endorsements of Singer (at least in respect of the first of the two), see 
T. M. Scanlon, "Contractualism and Utilitarianism," in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. 
Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 
pp. 103-28, p. 116; Paul Gomberg, "Consequentialism and History," Canadian Journal 
of Philosophy 19 (1989): 383-404; and Whelan, who gives a variant of Singer's argument 
at p. 164. 
5. For Singer's claim, see "Postscript to 'Famine, Affluence and Morality,"' pp. 
35-36, and esp. Practical Ethics, pp. 168-71. For the skepticism concerning it, see, e.g., 
O'Neill, pp. 56-58; Odegard, p. 92; Jan Narveson, "Equality vs. Liberty: Advantage, 
Liberty," Social Philosophy and Policy 2 (1984): 33-60, pp. 45-46; Barbara MacKinnon, 
"Pricing Human Life," Science, Technology and Human Values 11 (1986): 29-39, p. 38, 
n. 42; and Stephen J. Pope, "Love, Moral Values and Proportionalism," Heythrop Journal 
31 (1990): 199-205, p. 201. 
This content downloaded from 129.127.79.78 on Thu, 07 May 2015 22:52:55 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Cullity International Aid and Kindness 101 
or even simply a life which is not positively immoral, one might be 
precluded from pursuing practically any source of personal satisfac- 
tion? This problem (if it is a problem) arises directly for conceptions 
of the moral point of view as the impartial point of view; and it is in 
this form that the recent discussions have considered it.6 So considered, 
it invites the response that the moral point of view is not the impartial 
point of view; and one of the more forthright forms which this re- 
sponse can take is given by a position the advocates of which I shall 
call "Practical Ethicists." We may initially characterize this position as 
the view that those considerations which constitute the actual practical 
justifications of moral agents are not answerable to any further justifi- 
cation from the nonpractical principles of a moral theory.7 The Practi- 
cal Ethicist may then claim that the nature of actual practical justifica- 
tion does not support a conception of morality as impartiality.8 
Likewise, it seems that a Practical Ethicist can take a short way with 
6. Prominent recent treatments include Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character 
and Morality," in The Identities of Persons, ed. A. 0. Rorty (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1976), reprinted in Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cam- 
bridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19; James Fishkin, The Limits of Obligation (New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), chap. 10, and Equality and Partiality (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Susan Wolf, "Moral Saints,"Journal of Philosophy 
79 (1981): 419-39; Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1982), and Human Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); 
Shelly Kagan, "Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much? Recent Work on the Limits 
of Obligation," Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 239-54, and The Limits of Morality 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism and the De- 
mands of Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 134-71; and Michael Slote, 
Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985). 
7. Obviously, "nonpratical" and "theory" require further explanation: they receive 
it in Sec. I. Bernard Williams is a Practical Ethicist in this sense: see Ethics and the Limits 
of Philosophy (London: Collins, 1985), esp. chaps. 5, 6. So is Edmund L. Pincoffs, in his 
Quandaries and Virtues: Against Reductivism in Ethics (Lawrence: University Press of Kan- 
sas, 1986), chap. 4. Affinities with the Practical Ethicist's position are also to be found 
in G. E. M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," Philosophy, vol. 33 (1958), reprinted 
in her Ethics, Religion, and Politics, The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Ans- 
combe, vol. 3 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 26-42; Julius 
Kovesi, Moral Notions (London: Routledge, 1967); Peter Winch, Ethics and Action (Lon- 
don: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), esp. essays 2-6; Michael Stocker, "The Schizo- 
phrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 435-66; John 
McDowell, "Virtue and Reason," MoJnist 63 (1979): 331-50; and Alasdair MacIntyre, 
After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1985), esp. chaps. 4, 5. 
8. For this approach to the problem of demandingness, see Williams, "Persons, Char- 
acter and Morality." A Practical Ethicist might go further and reject the "problem of 
demandingness" as incoherent, on the grounds that there is no intelligible distinction be- 
tween the best life and the morally best life. (For some blasts in this spirit, see Maclntyre; 
and Richard Taylor, "Ancient Wisdom and Modern Folly," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 
13 [1988]: 54-63.) However, I am not taking this further claim as constitutive of the 
Practical Ethicist's position. 
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any argument that tries to convince us that we ought to reform our 
moral practice by accepting Singer's conclusions. 
However, this article's first aim is to show that there is a sound 
nonconsequentialist-indeed, a nontheoretical-argument for Singer's 
first, strong conclusion, that affluent people's not contributing money 
or time to aid agencies is immoral, in the same way that a bystander's 
failing to save a drowning child would be immoral. Its nontheoretical 
status means that the proponents of any plausible ethical theory should 
accept it, and that even Practical Ethicists should do so as well. The 
second aim is to show that, given this, it is not obvious what argument 
there is for resisting the second and stronger of Singer's two conclu- 
sions-that noncontribution only ceases to be wrong when one has 
reduced oneself to a level such that any further sacrifice would actually 
be worse for those whom one is trying to help. It follows that any 
moral outlook must address the problem of demandingness, whether 
or not it identifies the moral point of view with the impartial point 
of view. 
Now as Singer has claimed such a theoretical neutrality for his 
own argument, I must begin, in the first of the five sections of this 
article, by setting out the objections to it.9 
I. SINGER'S ARGUMENT 
Singer imagines that he is walking to a lecture when he sees a child 
drowning in a pond beside the path. He thinks it would be wrong not 
to rescue the child, and surely we should agree. Someone who is not 
moved to help under such circumstances-where saving a life requires 
nothing more than the inconvenience of a canceled lecture and a wet 
suit of clothes-exhibits a paradigmatically immoral lack of regard 
for other people. 
Singer's next step is to maintain that the judgment that I ought 
to save the drowning child is supported by, or at least exemplifies the 
truth of, the following principle: 
If it is in our power to prevent something very bad happening, 
without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral sig- 
nificance, we ought to do it.10 
9. See Singer's "Postscript to 'Famine, Affluence and Morality,"' pp. 35-36; and 
esp. his Practical Ethics, pp. 168-71. 
10. For this formulation of the principle, see Practical Ethics, p. 168, where the 
relation is held to be one of support. Singer's two earlier presentations of the argument 
give a slightly different formulation and claim also that a weaker principle will equally 
establish the conclusion that noncontribution to international aid agencies is wrong: 
"If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby 
sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it." See "Famine, 
Affluence and Morality," p. 231, and "Reconsidering the Famine Relief Argument," p. 
37. Compare Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1981), p. 253. 
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This principle, he maintains, should be accepted as uncontroversial 
by consequentialists and nonconsequentialists alike." Plausible forms 
of nonconsequentialism differ from consequentialism, according to 
Singer, not in rejecting the claim that we ought to prevent what is 
bad and promote what is good but in accepting other ultimate ethical 
claims as well. (His examples are nonconsequentialist assertions of the 
wrongness of violating rights, doing injustice, and breaking promises. 
According to Singer, even if the nonconsequentialist attaches greater 
disvalue to any of those than he does to the loss of a life, he is not 
thereby rejecting the proposed principle but is, rather, maintaining 
that the respecting of rights or promise-keeping is of comparable 
moral significance to the saving of lives.) Accordingly, a plausible non- 
consequentialism cannot deny that in those cases where nothing else 
of comparable moral significance is at stake, we ought to prevent 
very bad things from happening. Singer completes the argument by 
observing that the wrongness of noncontribution to aid agencies is 
entailed by the same principle, in conjunction with the claims that 
absolute poverty is very bad and that we can prevent some of it without 
sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance. 
I shall not recapitulate here the ensuing exchange between Singer 
and his critics over the meaning of the phrase "of comparable moral 
significance."'2 For what is more interesting is a series of objections 
which culminate in an attack not only on Singer's argument but on 
any alternative attempt to support his conclusion. 
The Anticonsequentialist's Objection 
The standard account of consequentialism is perhaps best character- 
ized as making it a two-part claim, that (i) states of affairs can be 
evaluated impersonally (i.e., without relativization to a proper subset 
of the set of persons); and (ii) the moral value of any object of moral 
evaluation (the principal ones being acts, intentions, states of charac- 
ter, people, and institutions) is a function of the impersonal values of 
those states of affairs to which it is related (as well as of the relation).'3 
We have noted Singer's claim that the adherents of any plausible 
nonconsequentialism share with consequentialists a principle that we 
11. See Singer's "Postscript to 'Famine, Affluence and Morality,"' pp. 35-36, and 
Practical Ethics, pp. 168-7 1. 
12. See esp. John Arthur, "Rights and the Duty to Bring Aid," in Aiken and 
LaFollette, eds., pp. 37-48, esp. pp. 39-44; and Singer's reply, in Aiken and LaFollette, 
eds., pp. 35-36. 
13. Compare Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, p. 1; Derek Parfit, Reasons 
and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), pp. 24-25; Philippa Foot, "Utilitarianism and 
the Virtues," Mind 94 (1985): 196-209, pp. 224-25; and Williams, "A Critique of 
Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 82-89. 
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ought to prevent what is bad and promote what is good, but weigh 
this against other moral principles, such as the principle that one 
ought not to infringe rights. However, many nonconsequentialists will 
be unprepared to accept this. 
A first objection will be that one cannot assess the goodness or 
badness of an event or state of affairs independently of ascertaining 
whether it involves (for example) the-infringement of a right. The 
more thoroughgoing anticonsequentialist objection is the denial that 
the rightness or wrongness of an action is ever a function of impersonally 
assigned values of those states of affairs which are its consequences.'4 
(It can make a difference to the wrongness of an action, on this view, 
whether it involves the agent's infringing a right, or whether it will 
lead to others' doing so.) Such a denial might be supported by asserting 
the unintelligibility ofjudgments concerning the goodness of states of 
affairs which are made independently of the perspective of a particular 
agent,15 or, if the intelligibility of such judgments is conceded, by 
denying that conclusions concerning the rightness or wrongness of 
the agent's actions can be derived from them. 
A deeper source of reservation about Singer's argument, though, 
is the following. 
The Methodological Objection 
Singer's discussion proceeds by considering a case which we are likely 
intuitively to agree with him is one of wrong action, and seeking to 
identify a plausible moral principle which will support the judgment 
that the action in question is wrong.'6 This provokes two sorts of 
methodological challenge. First, one might have doubts about the 
implied picture of the moral justification of action as involving the 
production of true universal moral principles which entail statements 
about the moral status of those actions and which it is the business 
of moral philosophy to discover. But there is more straightforward 
objection. To most people, it is about as obvious that there is a moral 
difference between our relations to a child drowning in front of us 
and a child starving in another country as it is that failing to save a 
drowning child is wrong. Accordingly, if we are to produce a principle 
which accords with our intuitive judgments, we had better adopt one 
which distinguishes cases of immediate emergency, like that of the 
14. On my reading of the standard account, someone who makes the first objection 
but not the second still qualifies as a consequentialist. 
15. See Foot, "Utilitarianism and the Virtues." 
16. I use 'intuition' and its cognates to refer to our unreflective moral opinions, 
and not as any part of an account of how we come by those opinions or of what their 
assertibility consists in. 
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drowning child, from other, more remote, cases of dire need.'7 If the 
constraints on the acceptability of basic moral principles are only those 
of consonance with intuition, then strongly counterintuitive conclu- 
sions must invalidate the principles from which they are derived. But 
if not, Singer needs to describe and defend the alternative set of con- 
straints which he is presupposing, and it is looking unlikelier than 
ever that he can do so while retaining his neutrality between all plausi- 
ble moral views. 
(Notice, moreover, that it will not be a satisfactory response to 
this to anatomize the various components which may contribute to 
the immediacy of an emergency-such as its physical promixity, the 
number of potential victims, the directness of my help and so on-and 
argue that none of them can support the moral significance attributed 
to the distinction.'8 A moral category like that of "immediate emer- 
gency," it might be objected, possesses its justifying force insofar as 
the circumstances with which we may be faced exemplify it, and not 
thanks to any further feature which a "naturalistic" reduction might 
attempt to identify. One might as well argue that torture is not morally 
wrong on the grounds that neither the deliberate infliction of pain, 
nor acting to secure one's own ends, nor any of the other particular 
features which cases of torture may have in common, is by itself mor- 
ally significant.) 
The Practical Ethicists' Objection 
The methodological objection just stated is certainly strong enough 
to constitute a serious problem for Singer, and also, it seems, for any 
hopes I might have had of arguing properly for Singer's conclusion 
in an article of this length. It seems that doing so would require me 
first to defend consequentialism, or some equally ambitious revisionary 
moral theory, against its many critics before being in a position to 
harness it to drawing conclusions about this particular issue. But more- 
over, my predicament may seem even worse than this. For there is a 
position concerning ethical justification which extends the line of 
thought contained in the methodological objection to maintain a con- 
clusion which is stronger still-the conclusion not simply that any 
attempt to establish the wrongness of noncontribution to aid agencies 
must involve a far more ambitious argument than that which Singer 
claims is necessary, but that any such attempt must fail. 
17. Compare Williams's more restricted point in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 
p. 186; and see also Judith Lichtenberg, "National Boundaries and Moral Boundaries," 
in Brown and Shue, eds., pp. 79-100; and Jonathan Bennett, "Morality and Conse- 
quences," in McMurrin, ed., pp. 45-116. 
18. This appears to be Singer's strategy in "Famine, Affluence and Morality," 
pp. 231-34. 
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The position I have in mind is the one advocated by "Practical 
Ethicists," whom we should now describe more precisely. Let us say 
that a practical consideration is a consideration which an agent regards 
(rightly or wrongly) as a justifying reason for action-that is, as a 
practical justification. An ethical theory, we may further stipulate, is a 
conceptual structure which makes the justificational status of a practi- 
cal consideration answerable to nonpractical principles-principles 
which are not themselves practical considerations (although they pur- 
port to supply the justification for taking certain considerations to be 
practical justifications). Given this, Practical Ethicists are those who 
make two claims: first, they deny that any ethical theory can provide 
us with good reason to revise our ethical practice; and second, they 
claim that the familiar normative schools in moral philosophy, sup- 
ported on either foundationalist or coherentist lines, constitute ethical 
theories in the proscribed sense, since the systematizing impulse which 
leads to their construction invokes nonpractical principles. 
The objection which seems available to Practical Ethicists is one 
which takes a short way not only with Singer's argument but with his 
conclusion. For, as has already been observed, we do recognize a 
practical distinction between immediate and nonimmediate threats to 
life. The immediacy of an emergency is itself a practical consideration, 
it seems, and if so, the Practical Ethicist may add to the methodological 
objection above, which maintained that without contentious theoreti- 
cal assumptions, Singer's revision of ethical practice cannot be de- 
fended, the further contention that no theoretical claims could consti- 
tute such a defense. 
Of course, this objection is only as serious as the plausibility of 
the Practical Ethicists' position. And on that question I shall have very 
little to say here. Suffice it to point out that the essence of their argu- 
ment is this: the pressure of foundationalist theories to accept nonprac- 
tical principles as the basis of practical justification, or exclusively to 
privilege some of the practical considerations we already recognize 
above others, and the pressure of coherentist theories to supersede 
our existing set of practical considerations through seeking principles 
for conferring a structure upon them, should be resisted simply by 
denying that the reasons which might be given for pursuing such 
theoretical enterprises have the justifying force of those practical con- 
siderations which we already recognize. The first challenge for Practi- 
cal Ethicists will be to show that their position does not commit them 
to the implausible-looking denial of the possibility of ethical argument 
and of the refutation of prejudice: their reply will be that the resources 
for ethical argument must come exclusively from practical considera- 
tions themselves.'9 Beyond this, there are two main options for their 
19. See Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, chap. 6; and Pincoffs, Quandaries 
and Virtues, chap. 4. 
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opponents: either to break the connection which they require between 
justification and motivation, maintaining that there are norms of prac- 
tical reason underwriting the possibility that we may be fundamentally 
misguided in what we regard as having justifying force; or to show 
how the desiderata of univocality, consistency, and simplicity embodied 
in the systematizing impulse are themselves derivable from practical 
considerations. 
However, a different line of response to the Practical Ethicists' 
objection is available, and it is developed in what follows. It will be 
maintained that "the Practical Ethicists' objection"-the claim that the 
Practical Ethicists' position generates a sound argument for the falsity 
of Singer's conclusions-should be rejected, not because of the im- 
plausibility of their position itself but because the objection is one 
which Practical Ethicists should not make. An alternative argument 
for Singer's conclusions is presented below which, it is claimed, even 
Practical Ethicists should accept. 
If one thinks that the Practical Ethicists' views concerning ethical 
justification deserve serious consideration (as I do), then this conclu- 
sion is itself significant. However, it will lead our discussion to a far 
more ambitious goal-one which presents an important challenge 
even to those who think the Practical Ethicists' position may be quickly 
dismissed. For in seeking an alternative to Singer's argument which 
circumvents all three of the objections which have been described, I 
shall be aiming to produce an argument for his conclusions which is 
uncommitted to any moral theory. And this is to say that the argument 
with which Singer's conclusions will be supported is one which should 
be accepted by the proponents of any plausible moral theory, as well 
as by their antitheoretical opponents. 
II. NONIMMEDIACY AND RACE 
The objections just raised against Singer's argument are good ones: 
his argument cannot be accepted as it stands. However, there is a 
sound argument for Singer's strong conclusion-that affluent people's 
not contributing money or time to aid agencies is immoral, in the 
same way that a bystander's failing to save a drowning child would be 
immoral-which circumvents the preceding objections. It need not 
defend any contentious ethical theory, since it appeals only to the 
simple practical considerations recognized by the possessors of the 
moral virtues of justice and kindness. 
Let us begin by stating the argument quickly, in a form which 
invites a reply in the spirit of the objections to Singer. We shall then 
need to develop the argument more carefully in order to show how 
the reply may be defeated. 
First Formulation 
How can we make sense of moral error without resorting to moral 
theory? Consider the terms women, Jews, barbarians, and Negroes. These 
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have in the past been used to designate moral categories the invocation 
of which purportedly justified discriminatory treatment: it was at one 
time seen as acceptable to treat one group but not another as enslav- 
able because the former were classified as Negroes.20 However, it would 
be a mistake to think that a Practical Ethicist must hold that if this 
was a well-entrenched practice of treating a certain practical consider- 
ation as a justification, and one from which its adherents refused to 
be dislodged by the challenges of would-be reformers, then there 
could be no question of its being morally erroneous. For against such 
a practice, the Practical Ethicist can endorse the following argument. 
Ethical practice includes certain forms of virtuous concern: kind- 
ness is a concern for the welfare of others, and justice at least includes 
a concern for fairness-a concern not to treat oneself in an unfairly 
preferential way. It is a sufficient condition of an action's being unkind 
and unjust that it manifests the absence of a concern for these objects. 
Now those slaveholders who were ethically motivated had no difficulty 
in recognizing that enslaving people of their own race would be unkind 
and unjust.2' What enabled them to suppose that racially based slavery 
was ethically justified was the belief in certain empirical or metaphysi- 
cal claims purporting to support differences in the natures or purposes 
of the different races.22 With the discrediting of those claims, there- 
fore, there has ceased to be any ground for holding that racial differ- 
ences support differences either in the extent to which a given form 
of treatment affects a person's welfare or in the fairness of that treat- 
ment. It follows that if a certain form of treatment of a European 
would be unkind or unjust, then the same form of treatment of a 
Negro would be equally unkind or unjust. Thus the attempt to use 
such categories to license differential treatment of members and non- 
members is itself unkind and unjust: it is in these respects morally 
wrong. Moral error is demonstrable using only the resources offered 
by moral practice itself.23 
The same strategy can be employed in arguing against noncontri- 
bution to aid agencies. First, the callousness of the person who fails 
20. See Winthrop D. Jordan, White over Black: American Attitudes toward the Negro, 
1550-1812 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), pp. 97-98. The 
early antislavery agitator Morgan Godwyn complained in 1680 that "these two words, 
Negro and Slave" had "by custom grown Homogeneous and Convertible" (The Negro's 
and Indians Advocate, Suingfor Their Admission into the Church [London, 1680], p. 36). 
21. To call enslaving someone "unkind," of course, sounds absurdly weak: "callous" 
is about the weakest term that would make conversational sense. It should not be 
controversial, though, that callousness is an extreme of the absence of concern for the 
welfare of others, which we may generically refer to as unkindness. 
22. See Jordan, pp. 3-43, 91-98. 
23. It seems that this already goes further than the sorts of arguments Williams 
countenances against such forms of prejudice in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 
pp. 115-17. 
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to pull Singer's drowning child out of the pond may plausibly be seen 
as exemplifying both unkindness and injustice. The failure to avert a 
threat to someone else's life (in a case like this, where there are no 
countervailing considerations) is manifestly unkind, involving as it does 
an extreme of the absence of a concern for other people's welfare. 
Equally, the grotesquely preferential treatment of oneself that such 
conduct embodies, in granting one's own convenience greater impor- 
tance than another person's life, could as plausibly incline us to charac- 
terize it as exhibiting injustice. 
But if the failure to save the drowning child exemplified un- 
kindness and injustice, then how does noncontribution to aid agencies 
differ? The starving people the threats to whose lives would be averted 
by such contributions are not right in front of us, and the help in 
question is not help we could give directly but only through the media- 
tion of an aid agency. However, like the other categories mentioned 
above, the nonimmediacy of the presentation of an emergency and 
the indirectness of the means of addressing it have no bearing in 
themselves upon the extent to which the threatened people's welfare 
is jeopardized or the extent to which not acting in their favor involves 
a hugely preferential weighting of my own interests over theirs. If 
kindness is a concern for other people's welfare and justice involves a 
concern not to treat oneself in an unfairly preferential way, then 
neither the nonimmediacy of the presentation of the threat nor the 
indirectness of the means of helping mitigates the unkindness and 
injustice of failing to respond to a threat to someone's life.24 And this 
equally amounts to a case for holding that the use of a category such 
as immediate emergency as a justification-conferring moral category is 
itself an exemplification of unkindness or injustice. An affluent per- 
son's not contributing money or time to international aid agencies is 
unkind and unjust; therefore, it is morally wrong. 
The Practical Ethicists' Reply 
The above introduces my argument for the first of Singer's conclu- 
sions. Stated in this way, however, it is unlikely to impress Singer's 
Practical Ethicist opponents. All I have done, they will protest, is to 
concoct tendentious definitions of the virtues of kindness and justice 
as concerns for welfare and nonpreferentiality in relation to people in 
general. But how are such definitions arrived at? Not, they will insist, 
by attending to the extension actually attributed to the terms in prac- 
tice: for, once more, we clearly do not regard our not averting nonim- 
24. Not the only, nor even (I think) the most harmful feature of destitution is its 
threatening people with death. The argument here is at its clearest, though, and if 
successful can be extended to cover other kinds of harm. 
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mediate threats to life as exhibiting the unkindness and injustice of 
the bystander who fails to save the drowning child. An onus has been 
placed upon me, the Practical Ethicists might repeat, to show why the 
practical distinctions which we recognize are indefensible: this cannot 
be done simply by adopting a moral usage which is incompatible with 
that practice. 
Thus there appears to be no obstacle to the Practical Ethicists' 
availing themselves of the argument against racism but refusing, 
through an adamant adherence to the actual distinctions of ethical 
practice, to extend the attack to categories such as nonimmediacy. 
Evidently, taking such a staunch line concerning ethical justification 
will mean that there are forms of prejudice against which they possess 
no argument: an example would be a whole society of racist bigots 
according to whose usage kindness and justice are owed essentially to 
members of one's own race (analogously to family loyalty).25 But here, 
they can deny that our lacking an argument against such a linguistic 
practice is at all unsatisfactory. From the perspective internal to our 
ethical practice, a person's being a member of my family is ajustifica- 
tion for acting toward him in ways in which I need not act toward 
others, whereas the consideration that a person is a member of the 
same race (however the racist proposes to individuate races) is not. 
There may be no external standpoint which we and the bigot are both 
committed to and from which the racially egalitarian attitude can be 
shown to be superior, but that is no reason for us (i.e., for those whose 
reasons are the reasons of the egalitarian standpoint) to relinquish 
our endorsement of racial equality. 
But if the entrenchment of ajustificatory practice within a linguis- 
tic community is not something against which an argument for reform 
can be furnished, then this seems fatal to the project being attempted 
here. For proponents of the claim concerning the irrelevance of imme- 
diacy to kindness and justice are indisputably in the minority. 
Second Formulation 
The objection of our Practical Ethicist opponents appears well taken. 
It can be met, however, by a more careful formulation of the argument, 
along the following lines: 
25. One does not encounter such views in the contemporary seminar-room, but 
they can hardly yet be assigned to the annals of historical curiosity. "One basic principle 
must be the absolute rule for the S.S. men: we must be honest, decent, loyal and 
comradely to members of our own blood and nobody else.... Our concern, our duty is 
our people and our blood. We can be indifferent to everything else" (Heinrich Himmler, 
speech at Posen, October 4, 1943, Nuremberg Trial Document N.D. 1,919-PS, cited in 
Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny [London: Odhams, 1952], pp. 638-39). 
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1. When one is aware of threats to other people's lives, the failure 
to take available steps to avert those threats is unkind and 
unjust, unless there are countervailing considerations. 
2. An affluent person's contributions to voluntary international 
aid agencies will avert threats to people's lives. 
3. Therefore, unless there are countervailing considerations, the 
failure of any affluent person to contribute to voluntary inter- 
national aid agencies is unkind and unjust. 
4. The fact that affluent people are not immediately presented 
with the threats in question is not a countervailing consid- 
eration. 
5. There is no other countervailing consideration. 
6. Therefore, the failure of any affluent person to contribute to 
voluntary international aid agencies is unkind and unjust. 
7. Therefore, the failure of any affluent person to contribute to 
voluntary international aid agencies is morally wrong. 
The reader can hardly be expected to find this convincing as it 
stands. For how are we to defend Claim (1), without simply presuppos- 
ing the claims concerning unkindness and injustice to which we have 
just seen the Practical Ethicists' objection? What needs to be shown is 
why we should adopt the generalized conception of kindness and jus- 
tice which it employs, as against the immediacy-sensitive conception 
to which, according to the Practical Ethicist, we do adhere. And first of 
all, what are "countervailing considerations"? The next section answers 
these questions. 
III. KINDNESS AND JUSTICE 
To support the generalized conception of kindness and justice, let us 
begin by introducing the notion of "agent-justification." 
Agent-Justification 
Let us say that one is a morally decent agent to the extent that what one 
does (where this is taken, in the broadest sense, to include the motiva- 
tion of one's actions) is not morally wrong. In most circumstances, it 
seems that many different actions will be available to a morally decent 
agent, but presented with the drowning child, anyone who qualifies 
as a morally decent agent must pull him out of the water, since failing 
to do so would be wrong. 
Next, let us say that a person's agent-justification for an action 
is the respect in which she regards it (rightly or wrongly) as worth 
performing.26 An agent-justification, then, cites certain features which 
26. That an agent-justification of an action might not be a bona fide justification 
of it is least controversially illustrated by the possibility of false beliefs concerning the 
means to one's ends. 
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a given agent attributes to the action of which it is the agent-justifica- 
tion: if the attribution is correct, the agent-justification will cite facts 
about the action; if not, it will cite false propositions.27 A conclusive 
agent-justification, let us further stipulate, is an agent-justification 
which reports the respects in which an agent sees an action as more 
attractive than any available alternative. 
Now in the case of most actions, asking a person in what respect 
she thought what she did was worth doing would be an odd thing to 
do, since the answer will be very simple and obvious. And this will 
surely be true of the actions of most morally decent agents in saving 
the drowning child. The conclusive agent-justification of most morally 
decent agents for pulling the drowning child out of the water will 
simply be the fact that his life is threatened, together with the fact 
that by pulling him out they will avert the threat to his life. 
Breadth and Depth 
This is not to suggest that all agent-justifications possess such simplic- 
ity. No doubt, there are some morally decent agents for whom these 
facts alone do not constitute the whole of their agent-justification for 
pulling him out. We may distinguish two.possibilities here, of an agent- 
justification which is either "broader" or "deeper" than this simple one. 
The former possibility will be that of a morally decent agent who 
only regards pulling the child out of the water as an action worth 
performing because the two facts cited above are conjoined with some 
further fact. For example, unless a Kantian conscientiousness is mor- 
ally objectionable, there will be some morally decent agents whose 
reason for pulling out the drowning child will be the conjunction of 
these facts with the further fact that it is one's duty to come to the aid 
of those whose lives are threatened.28 
The second possibility is that of a morally decent agent of a more 
theoretical cast, for whom the agent-justification which has been cited 
is supplemented not by conjoining any further facts about the action 
to the two already mentioned but by supplying an account of why the 
facts which have been cited are ajustification of the action. According 
to those morally decent agents whose agentjustification is "deeper" 
than the one mentioning only the two facts, there is a justification for 
the practice of regarding the two facts as a justification. (Kantians, of 
course, will also want to claim this for the three facts they cite.) 
27. Notice that what I am asserting is quite compatible with allowing that there is 
a sense in which all action is motivated by beliefs and desires. 
28. For the question of the moral defectiveness of a Kantian ethic of duty, see 
Marcia Baron, "The Alleged Moral Repugnance of Acting from Duty,"Journal of Philoso- 
phy 81 (1984): 197-220. 
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Those whose agent-justification for pulling out the drowning 
child is fuller, in either of these two ways, than the one initially de- 
scribed need not be thought at all morally inferior. The claim is merely 
that the more spontaneous and less reflective disposition of the person 
whose agent-justification consists only in the two facts is not morally 
wrong. (I may appear to be taking on Kant here, but while he famously 
holds that only the motive of duty, in contradistinction to the spontane- 
ous motivation, possesses true moral worth, he does not deny that the 
spontaneously kind person does what is morally right.)29 The facts 
that a life is threatened and that by acting in a certain way one will 
avert the threat can comprise the complete agent-justification which 
a morally decent agent possesses for acting in that way.30 
Countervailing Considerations 
It is of great importance to see that maintaining this does not mean 
endorsing the implausible claim that for a morally decent agent of this 
sort, these two facts must constitute conclusive agent-justifications for 
acts of helping in all situations in which they obtain. This claim is 
highly dubious: if my saving one person would preclude saving many 
others, and he is responsible for the threats to their lives, it might 
even be morally wrong to save him instead of the others. But recogniz- 
ing this should not lead us to think that the agent-justifications of 
a morally decent agent in the straightforward cases must be more 
complicated than the one cited above. For surely agent-justifica- 
tions-the respects in which actions appear to agents to be worthy of 
pursuit-need not include the nonobtaining of all those counterfac- 
tual possibilities under which the action would not have been attractive. 
The absence of any masked gunmen from my study was not one of 
the respects in which it seemed to me to be a good idea to walk into 
it this evening. Similarly, there is no inconsistency in holding that the 
simple agent-justification suggested above can in some circumstances 
be complete for a morally decent agent while accepting that there are 
other circumstances in which a morally decent agent might not save 
a person, even though his life is threatened. 
We can express this as follows. Let us say that a consideration 
countervails against the force of a certain set of facts as an agent- 
justification for an action under a given description if and only if 
in the absence of that consideration, those facts would have been a 
29. See Immanuel Kant, The Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. J. 
Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 65-67; or Prussian Academy ed., pp. 
397-99. 
30. This is of course consistent with allowing that there may be some further 
standard of justification, of which he is unaware, which supports this practical attitude 
of his. 
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conclusive agent-justification for the action under that description, but 
owing to its presence they are not. Our point is then that the absence 
of countervailing considerations need not itself be part of an agent- 
justification. In circumstances where countervailing considerations are 
absent, a morally decent agent's agent-justification can consist in the 
two simple facts mentioned above. Notice that countervailing consider- 
ations need not take the form of "stronger" considerations which "out- 
weigh" those against which they countervail-although sometimes 
they do. In circumstances where the agent-justification I have for 
letting someone die is that trying to save him would have meant seri- 
ously endangering the lives of my own family, it might well be appro- 
priate to characterize me as holding that the threat to my family 
outweighs the threat to him: the presence of the countervailing consid- 
eration might not weaken the agentjustification for saving the person 
but provide an opposing consideration to which I attribute greater 
force.3' However, things seem different in the case where my agent- 
justification for not helping is that the person in question is responsible 
for many other threats which I could avert instead: this time, the 
suggestion is that the further considerations countervail by lessen- 
ing-perhaps, in some such cases, annulling completely-the extent 
to which the threat to him makes helping him worth doing, rather 
than by simply supplying stronger opposing considerations which out- 
weigh it.32 
It is also important to note that nothing has been said to deny 
the context-sensitivity of agent-justifications and, correspondingly, of 
the considerations which countervail against them. Given that an 
agent-justification supplies the description under which an agent sees 
an action as worthwhile, the content of an agent-justification will de- 
pend upon the agent's expectations of normality. Thus if in circum- 
stances of wartime destitution it becomes normal both to encounter 
strangers whose lives are threatened and to know that one's own family 
would be jeopardized if one helped, then a morally decent agent might 
become accustomed to not helping; and against this background, when 
he unusually encounters someone whom he can save withoutjeopard- 
izing his family, the fact that it does not jeopardize them might well 
become part of his agent-justification. So although in the earlier cases 
the absence of countervailing considerations was not part of an agent- 
31. If it doesn't even occur to me to do anything other than to secure the safety 
of my family, of course, then there won't be a question of one agent-justification's 
outweighing another. 
32. Compare Shelly Kagan, "The Additive Fallacy," Ethics 99 (1988): 5-31, which 
attacks the assumption that "the function that determines the overall status of the act 
given the values of the particular [moral] factors [present in the act] is an additive one" 
(p. 14). 
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justification, in conditions where the presence of those considerations 
is normal, their absence is capable of being one of the salient features 
of an action that make it worth performing. 
The Scope of Kindness 
The claim I have been defending is that one form of moral decency 
is the disposition-in the absence of countervailing considerations- 
to take the facts that a person's life is threatened and that my M-ing 
would avert the threat as comprising a conclusive agent-justification 
for M-ing. A disposition selectively to accept certain sorts of agent- 
justifications as conclusive is naturally redescribable as a form of con- 
cern.33 Accordingly, the disposition just identified may be equivalently 
described as a concern to avert threats to life, unless there are counter- 
vailing considerations. Now it does not seem wrong to say that the 
Kantian agent, whose agent-justification essentially includes the fur- 
ther thought that she has a duty to avert threats to life, is also con- 
cerned to avert threats to life. However, there is a difference in the 
nature of the concerns: the agent with whom we have been preoccu- 
pied is someone who is concerned to avert threats to life for no further 
reason than that they are threats to life; the conscientious Kantian is 
concerned to do so because doing so will fulfill her duty. Let us say 
that the first agent is finally concerned to avert threats to life: she is 
concerned to do so for no further reason. 
The reader will recognize the former, final concern to avert threats 
to life as an instance of the virtue of kindness. Only an instance; 
for of course, kindness concerns more than threats to life-but the 
description of kindness as a whole, generalizing the observations so 
far, presents no difficulty. Kindness is-extensionally-a final concern 
for the welfare of others, unless there are countervailing considera- 
tions. An agent would have to be given to abstractions, of course, to 
be concerned about the welfare of others, under that description, but 
we can say of those goods which do characteristically engage the con- 
cern of the kind person, under their various descriptions (e.g., as the 
averting of a threat to life) that what they have in common is their 
comprising the welfare of others. 
Kindness, we have seen, requires the right concern in the right 
circumstances.34 We saw above that the possession of kindness is com- 
patible with not offering one's-help to those who would greatly benefit 
from it, in the presence of certain countervailing considerations-but 
also that the absence of those countervailing considerations will not 
33. To see the force of "selectively" here, consider the disposition to act on whatever 
agent-justification happens to cross one's mind or amuse one. This is not a concern for 
anything, unless it expresses a judgment of the superiority of undirected activity. 
34. Compare Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1 109a26-29. 
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normally feature as part of the kind person's agentjustification under 
those circumstances where such considerations are absent. And this 
point may be reexpressed in the vocabulary of concern. Kindness is 
(extensionally) not a final concern for those goods which comprise the 
welfare of others in the absence of countervailing considerations but, rather, 
a final concern, in the absence of countervailing considerations, for 
those goods which comprise the welfare of others: the absence of the counter- 
vailing considerations does not lie within the scope of the concern 
which is characteristic of kindness. 
A corresponding definition of unkindness presents few difficul- 
ties: unkindness is (extensionally) the absence of a concern for the 
welfare of others, when there are no countervailing considerations. 
(The point to notice here is that one may lack kindness without thereby 
being unkind, provided one has a nonfinal concern for the same goods. 
The conscientious Kantian and the caricature of piety who is con- 
cerned only to help others as a means to his own salvation illustrate 
this possibility: such agents, although not kind, are not unkind.) 
If this is the nature of unkindness, then it is possible to argue for 
conclusions concerning unkindness in the following way. If one is to 
possess (extensionally) a concern for the welfare of others, there are 
certain agentjustifications on which one must act, unless there are 
countervailing considerations. For instance, when there are no counter- 
vailing considerations, failing to avert what one knows to be a threat 
to someone's life when one could avert it manifests the absence of a 
concern for his welfare. But the absence of such a concern, unaccom- 
panied by any countervailing consideration, is unkind. And from this, 
we can draw the conclusion: 
When one is aware of threats to other people's lives, the failure 
to take available steps to avert those threats is unkind, unless 
there are countervailing considerations. 
Justice 
A similar set of observations may be made concerning justice. 
The virtue ofjustice, like that of kindness, is describable as a final 
concern for objects of a certain sort.35 A kind person is concerned 
about objects such as threats to people's lives, their needs, and their 
comfort: in general, we have observed that what these concerns have 
in common is that they exemplify a concern for the welfare of others. 
The objects of a just person's final concern, by contrast, include other 
people's rights, her own duties, fairness of distribution, and desert. It 
is difficult to say anything very interesting about what the concerns 
35. Not all virtues are describable in this way: contrast courage and other "execu- 
tive" virtues. 
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for these various objects have in common, for the best general descrip- 
tion is that they are all (extensionally) concerns for the justice of states 
of affairs.36 
Once more, just forms of concern are equivalently expressible as 
dispositions to accept certain sorts of agent-justifications as conclusive. 
Thus the virtue of justice includes the disposition to take a person's 
deserving X as a conclusive agent-justification for giving him X (in the 
absence of countervailing considerations), and the disposition to take 
an action ?'s involving an unreasonably preferential weighting of 
my own interests over those of other people as a conclusive agent- 
justification not to '1 (in the absence of countervailing considerations). 
It is a sufficient condition of one's possessing injustice that one lack 
these dispositions. 
Again, the necessity of including the absence of countervailing 
considerations in the specification of the dispositions constitutive of 
the virtue ofjustice (but not within the scope of the agent-justification) 
should be obvious enough. If X is not mine to give, it may be unjust 
to give it to someone, even if he deserves it. 
This gives us a parallel argument to the one concerning kindness. 
Unless there are countervailing circumstances, failing to avert a threat 
to someone else's life at a small cost to myself involves an unreasonably 
preferential weighting of my interests over his. Therefore, we are 
entitled to extend our previous finding, as follows: 
1. When one is aware of threats to other people's lives, the failure 
to take steps to avert those threats is unkind and unjust, unless 
there are countervailing considerations. 
IV. NONIMMEDIACY AS A COUNTERVAILING 
CONSIDERATION 
Now I might seem still to be a long way from a satisfactory reply to 
the Practical Ethicist opponents of Section II. For it would appear 
that the foregoing defense of Claim (1) of my argument simply com- 
pels them to rephrase their attack in a new vocabulary. It has been 
asserted that the failure to avert threats to the lives of others is unkind 
and unjust, unless there are countervailing considerations. Why can't 
they decisively reply that the nonimmediacy of the presentation of 
the threat simply is recognized by us as an adequate countervailing 
consideration? 
The response to this begins by asking a question of my own. The 
failure to avert a threat to someone else's life, where there are no 
countervailing considerations, is both unkind and unjust. But given 
the various considerations to which we do attribute such countervailing 
36. Compare Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 180. 
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force, do those considerations explain why an action which is a failure 
to avert such a threat may nonetheless be neither unkind nor unjust, 
or must this simply be accepted as a brute fact? The case for the 
former will soon become plausible when we consider some instances. 
How Considerations Countervail 
One consideration to which such countervailing force is standardly 
attributed is that of whether my own life would be seriously endan- 
gered by any attempt to avert a threat to someone else. The way in 
which this consideration countervails seems to be by outweighing 
rather than annulling the considerations in favor: a morally decent 
agent, that is to say, will still see the threat to the other person as 
being as strong a consideration in favor of helping as it is in the 
straightforward case of the drowning child, but she might find a 
stronger consideration in the preservation of her own safety without 
thereby proving herself to be unkind. Why should one think so? A 
simple thought which suggests itself is that the presence of the consid- 
eration that the agent's own life is threatened explains how not saving 
the other person is compatible with a genuine concern for his welfare. 
It is possible, the thought goes, to be genuinely concerned about his 
welfare but more concerned for my own-we'll need an extensive set 
of arguments for a contentious moral system such as that which some 
forms of consequentialism provide if we are to show that there is 
anything morally wrong with that.37 If kindness is a concern for the 
welfare of other people, therefore, the presence of such a consider- 
ation shows how a person's refraining from averting a threat to some- 
one else's life can be reconciled with the claim that she is kind. 
Let us turn next to a consideration which appears to countervail 
in a different way. If I offer to massage the limbs of a weary torturer, 
this is not merely not an act of kindness; it may be morally obnoxious. 
And yet it might be motivated by a simpleminded concern for his 
welfare; why isn't it kind? A plausible answer is not hard to find: 
although perhaps my offer to the torturer could manifest a concern 
for his welfare, it is incompatible with a concern for his victims. The 
point here does not primarily concern his future victims, we may add: 
even if his torturing career is over, it is incompatible with a respect 
for his past victims to have anything to do with him apart from punish- 
ing him. This explanation, moreover, shows why we should think of 
the countervailing consideration in this case not as outweighing the 
consideration in favor of helping but as annulling it; the sort of concern 
constitutive of kindness will lead the kind person to see the fact that 
an action of his could alleviate the weariness of a torturer as a consider- 
37. But see Kagan, The Limits of Morality, for such a set of arguments. 
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ation against, rather than in favor of it. The case of the drowning 
person who is responsible for many other threats is naturally treated 
in the same way (if it is right that his responsibility does lessen the 
extent to which it is appropriate to help him). 
The same suggestion applies with equal plausibility to those con- 
siderations to which we attribute countervailing force in relation to 
justice. If X is not mine to give, then giving it, even to someone who 
deserves it, may be arrogating to myself a privilege which I rely on 
others' renouncing and, if so, is in this way incompatible with a concern 
for justice. Again, the point is simply that this is the sort of case in 
which giving a person what he deserves is incompatible with the con- 
cern of the just person for justice. 
And cases in which taking someone else's property to help a third 
person is not unjust-I must take the nearest coat in the restaurant 
to put out a fire, say-are accounted for in the same way. No such 
arrogation is involved if I need X in order to save a life, and hence 
no injustice is done. Thus its bearing upon the concerns constitutive 
of the virtue once more explains why such a consideration should or 
should not countervail against the agentjustification in question as 
an expression of justice. 
It is readily apparent, therefore, that the attribution of counter- 
vailing force to such considerations, in relation to the agent-justifica- 
tions characteristic of kindness and justice, is not simply to be accepted 
as a brute fact. In each case, the presence of a consideration to which 
such countervailing force is attributed explains, in a simple and trans- 
parent way, why not acting on the agentjustification in question is 
after all compatible with the virtue, and does so in a way which makes 
apparent the appropriateness of the manner in which it counter- 
vails-whether by outweighing the agentjustification or annulling it. 
International Aid and Nonimmediacy 
From here, our argument may be quickly completed. We have just 
seen the way in which the presence of countervailing considerations, 
given the failure to act on an agentjustification which is conclusive 
for morally decent agents in other circumstances, shows how such a 
failure can be reconciled with a virtue. But once the reconciliatory role 
of countervailing considerations is revealed, the argument proceeds as 
before. For as with considerations of racial membership, it is hard to 
see how the immediacy with which an emergency presents itself to a 
potential helper is relevant to either outweighing or annulling the 
considerations of welfare and fairness which count for a morally decent 
agent in favor of helping. The putatively countervailing consideration 
of immediacy surely does not show how the threatened people are in 
any way less worthy of one's concern or will benefit to a lesser extent 
from it. But nor does it show how the huge disparity in the extents 
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to which our interests are compromised, mine by helping and his by 
not being helped, is in any way mitigated. It does not appear that 
nonimmediacy lessens the extent to which, if threats to others in gen- 
eral provide a kind or just person with a strong consideration in favor 
of helping, they do so in this case also. However, it is if anything less 
clear how the consideration of nonimmediacy can provide a stronger, 
outweighing consideration which opposes the threat to life as a ground 
for acting. 
In short, although in the case of other candidates for the role of 
considerations which countervail for a morally decent agent against 
the agent-justifications characteristic of kindness andjustice, it is possi- 
ble to show how such considerations successfully reconcile the concern 
for the welfare of others or for justice with one's not helping, this is 
no more convincing in the case of nonimmediacy than it is with respect 
to race, and consequently the claim of both to such a countervailing 
role should be rejected. That is to say: 
4. The fact that affluent people are not immediately presented 
with the threats in question is not a countervailing consideration. 
Racism Revisited 
In Section II, we considered the prospect of a society of bigots who 
assimilate racial loyalty to family loyalty. Proponents of the Practical 
Ethicists' objection had to accept that they possessed no argument 
against such a practice; they contented themselves with the assurance 
that the bigots possess no argument against our emphatically different 
moral outlook which we have a reason to credit with any force. 
However, it is a corollary of our argument that there is something 
further to say here. For not even within a discriminatory practice of the 
sort being considered will racial considerations themselves standardly 
enter into the scope of the forms of concern characteristic of kindness 
and justice. The practice is, rather, one of treating racial considerations 
as countervailing in relation to those forms of concern-as deter- 
mining the circumstances in which that concern is regarded as appro- 
priate. (The racially exclusive concern, that is, is [extensionally] a con- 
cern not for white people's welfare but for people's welfare, provided they're 
white.) But again, such a practice is impossible to reconcile with our 
explanation of why a morally decent agent should properly attribute 
countervailing force to a given consideration. In the absence of an 
argument for attributing different natures to the members of different 
races, we lack any grounds for holding that their welfare would be 
affected differently by the same treatment or that the fairness of the 
treatment would differ with race. That is, racial considerations do 
nothing to reconcile one's not acting on the agent-justifications charac- 
teristic of kindness and justice with the possession of the relevant 
forms of concern. Therefore, such a discriminatory practice-even if 
This content downloaded from 129.127.79.78 on Thu, 07 May 2015 22:52:55 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Cullity International Aid and Kindness 121 
widespread-stands, morally, in need of further support which its 
practitioners refuse to supply. If they then ask us what is wrong with 
unkindness and injustice, perhaps the Archimedean move is all that 
is left, taking refuge in the claim that there is no external standpoint 
from which this could be demonstrated, but none from which it could 
be invalidated either. However, it is only having reached this point 
that we should contemplate such a move.38 
Notice, importantly, that the above argument is compatible with 
allowing that, in a culture in which racism is prevalent, someone who 
gives no consideration even to members of his own race is more unkind 
and unjust than the rest. For of course, it is not surprising, for the 
reasons which the bigot tries to claim as a justification, that people 
have in many societies tended to treat members of other races as being 
worthy of less consideration than members of their own. Where such 
a practical distinction is widely observed, a lack of consideration for 
the members of one's own race will typically indicate a depth of indif- 
ference which precludes to a greater degree the forms of concern 
constitutive of kindness and justice. 
This gives us a parallel point in relation to the immediacy of 
the presentation of a threat to someone else's life. Our motivation to 
recognize threats to life as reasons for acting in a person's favor will 
be triggered far more easily when the facts in question are right in 
front of us. It is not at all surprising that we respond more readily to 
threats to life when they are presented to us immediately; conse- 
quently, we ought to say that the failure to respond even to those 
emergencies with which one is immediately confronted exhibits a 
depth of indifference to the interests of other people which makes it 
more unkind or unjust than the failure to act in response to more 
distant need. My claim is not that the extent to which a person is 
moved by the situations of distress with which she is directly confronted 
is irrelevant to moral assessment. 
However, while this explains the difference between the degrees 
of unkindness or injustice exhibited by indifference to immediate as 
against nonimmediate emergencies, it remains the case that unless 
some further feature of noncontribution to aid agencies may be identi- 
fied to which countervailing force may plausibly be attributed, there 
is the same reason for regarding noncontribution as wrong as there 
is for regarding the failure to save a drowning child as wrong. It 
may not be as wrong, but it is wrong nonetheless, and wrong in the 
same way. 
38. "But why doesn't this argument equally entail an attack on family loyalty?" 
The answer, of course, is that it does. For the family loyalty which is analogous to the 
racist's, limiting the sphere of kindness and justice exclusively to the members of one's 
own family, is that of the Mafioso, against whom the argument is the same. 
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Moral Revision without Moral Theory 
After giving the first formulation of our argument for the wrongness 
of noncontribution to aid agencies, I acknowledged that it relied upon 
generalized conceptions of the virtues of kindness and justice as con- 
cerns for welfare and nonpreferentiality in relation to people in gen- 
eral. The Practical Ethicists' challenge was that the incompatibility of 
those conceptions with the practical moral distinctions we are actually 
making, in regarding noncontribution to aid agencies as neither un- 
kind nor unjust, is a ground not for rejecting our moral practice but 
for rejecting those conceptions of the virtues. 
The response to this has been to give a brief and partial account 
of the virtues of kindness andjustice, containing three essential points. 
First, kindness andjustice are particular forms of concern: dispositions 
selectively to accept particular sorts of agent-justifications as conclu- 
sive. Speaking extensionally, kindness is a final concern for the welfare 
of others, and justice includes a final concern to avoid giving oneself 
unreasonably preferential treatment. Second, although other consid- 
erations may countervail against the agent-justifications which are 
characteristic of these virtues, supplying conditions under which a 
person's not acting on those agentjustifications may nonetheless be 
neither unkind nor unjust, the countervailing considerations do not 
enter into the scope of the concern which characterizes each virtue. 
And third, the considerations to which this countervailing force is 
attributed do explain how one's not acting on the agentjustification 
which characterizes a virtue is nonetheless reconcilable with the posses- 
sion of that virtue. But if so, the fact that someone else's life is threat- 
ened is an agent-justification which is conclusive for anyone who is 
not unkind, unless there are countervailing considerations. And the 
nonimmediacy of the presentation of the threat is not a countervailing 
consideration. 
But perhaps we need to consider one last Practical Ethicist re- 
sponse to this, of the same form as the earlier ones. Can't a Practical 
Ethicist object that if the proposed account of ourjustificatory practice 
does not accommodate the whole of that practice, then it is not the 
practice which is at fault, but the account? 
Now if Practical Ethicists could supplement this challenge by pro- 
ducing an alternative explanation of how considerations can counter- 
vail in relation to the agentjustifications characteristic of the virtues 
of kindness and justice-one which handled the undisputed cases but 
also accommodated nonimmediacy-they would have a powerful ob- 
jection. But until they do so, their complaint that the above account 
is incompatible with our justificatory practice falls flat. They are left 
simply asserting that immediacy is a countervailing consideration, even 
though it does nothing to show how failing to act on a practicaljustifi- 
cation central to kindness andjustice is compatible with the possession 
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of those virtues. They are left, that is to say, with a picture on which 
countervailing considerations do not justify at all. 
The Practical Ethicist cannot dismiss as unnecessary or unintelli- 
gible the question of how considerations countervail against the agent- 
justifications characteristic of a virtue. This does require an explana- 
tion, for the following reason. As we have seen, a kind or just person's 
agentjustification for averting a threat to someone's life need only 
consist in a certain simple consideration-the consideration that his 
life is threatened and that she could avert the threat. But if this simple 
consideration is, in some circumstances, regarded as a justification, 
then it must be so regarded in the others in which it is present, unless 
there is some appropriately countervailing consideration. And the only 
way in which a consideration might appropriately countervail is by 
justifying one's not acting on the simple consideration, despite its pres- 
ence. An account has been given on which that justifying force is 
transparent. A consideration plainly possesses such force if it reconciles 
one's not acting on the simple agentjustification with the forms of 
concern- kindness and justice-which recognize the agentjustifica- 
tion as conclusive elsewhere. However, the attribution of such counter- 
vailing force to considerations such as those of race or of nonimmedi- 
acy cannot be rendered intelligible in this way. In the absence of a 
better explanatory account, the attribution of countervailing force to 
such considerations cannot be seen as part of a justificatory practice 
at all. 
One further question must be addressed in order to complete our 
discussion. How do we explain the existence of a practice of treating 
certain considerations as if they possess countervailing force, when 
they do not? In the case both of race and of nonimmediacy, there is a 
straightforward explanation. When we consider the practice of racially 
based slavery, the moral complacency of our forebears may be ex- 
plained-without thereby justifying it-by pointing to the natural 
affinity of people toward what is similar and familiar to themselves, 
and the natural fear of the unfamiliar; to the lack of contact and hence 
of comprehension between races; and to the recurrence of interracial 
conflicts which have fostered xenophobic currents within most cul- 
tures. In the same way, explanations of the source of the strength of 
our misguided intuitions concerning the practical significance of the 
immediacy of emergencies come readily to hand. First, the distinction 
gives us a cozier morality which it is easy to live up to. And second, it 
is only relatively recently that we have-been supplied with the means 
(through the existence of international aid agencies) of easily helping 
the very poor of other countries. Throughout the centuries prior to 
the existence of such agencies, not helping the destitute abroad was 
not wrong, since such help was not within people's power; and the 
moral tradition which we have inherited evolved in that different era. 
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Does the argument for moral reform presented here draw on 
a theory, in the Practical Ethicists' proscribed sense? No-for the 
justification which is being claimed for the wrongness of not contribut- 
ing to aid agencies is simply the practical consideration that threats to 
people's lives could thereby be averted; and for all that has been said 
to the contrary, there may be no nonpractical principle to which the 
practice of regarding such considerations as practical justifications is 
itself justificationally answerable. Of course, I have had to invoke a 
canon of consistency in presenting the argument for moral reform. 
However, it will be difficult for a Practical Ethicist to find an objection 
to this. For one thing, objecting to the pursuit of consistency in moral- 
ity does begin to make their problem of distinguishing ethical practice 
from prejudice appear insurmountable. Any argument which pur- 
ports to provide reasons for revising one's moral views is going to need 
to have recourse to a requirement of consistency. And anyway, it is 
simply a condition of moral action's even purporting to involve practi- 
cal justification that it should be answerable to such a requirement. I 
cannot claim a consideration as ajustification for a certain action in one 
set of circumstances, but not do so in another, unless I am prepared to 
invoke countervailing differences between the two. 
V. FURTHER WORK 
Our argument has employed Singer's basic strategy, of comparing 
noncontribution to aid agencies with Bad Samaritanism, to support 
the conclusion that such noncontribution is morally wrong. Three 
objections were raised against Singer's own formulation of the argu- 
ment, but we have seen that it can be reformulated, as an argument 
about kindness and justice, in a way which avoids them. In arguing 
from an account of the practices of practicaljustification characteristic 
of the virtues, we have not relied upon an ethical theory; therefore, 
Practical Ethicists should accept our conclusion. But nor have we pre- 
cluded the possibility that there is a true ethical theory. For perhaps 
there is a further reason-and maybe a theoretical reason-why un- 
kindness and injustice should be regarded as wrong. (Perhaps, on the 
other hand, we have reached the end of the justificational line, as we 
have when I adduce in support of my contention that a period of 
illness was bad the fact that it was boring.)39 The Practical Ethicist and 
the theorist may be left to debate this point: all we require is the 
absence of any compelling justification for abandoning the conviction 
that unkindness and injustice are morally wrong. Both the Practical 
39. See Philippa Foot, "Moral Beliefs," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 
(1958): 83-104, esp. p. 101, reprinted in her Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1978), p. 127. 
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Ethicist and the proponent of any plausible ethical theory should ac- 
cept our argument. 
This consitutes a strong presumptive case for the conclusion that 
the failure of any affluent person to contribute to voluntary interna- 
tional aid agencies is morally wrong. Only a presumptive case, though: 
for although Claims (1) and (4) have been defended here, the two 
other premises of the argument have not been discussed. Obviously, 
both are required to produce a sound argument, but they have been 
extensively discussed elsewhere.40 
Let us recall them briefly. Claim (2) was 
2. An affluent person's contributions to voluntary international 
aid agencies will avert threats to people's lives. 
It is sometimes denied that the net effect of the activity of aid agencies 
is the averting of threats to people's lives. More subtly, it may be 
objected that even if aid agencies avert threats to people's lives, the 
contribution of any one affluent person will probably not do so.41 
Unless there are satisfactory answers to these objections, the case pre- 
sented here for the wrongness of noncontribution to aid agencies 
clearly collapses. And just as clearly, I require the truth of Claim (5): 
5. There is no other countervailing consideration. 
Here the sorts of claims which must be considered (and which have 
been, by others) are that by feeding the world's surplus population 
now we are simply contributing to worse problems in the future, that 
responsibility for the welfare of the destitute belongs to governments 
rather than to us, that the absence of proper birth control practices 
in poor countries makes them responsible for their own plight, that 
since we have a valid right to our money it cannot be wrong for us to 
keep it, that paternalistic interference in the affairs of another country 
is wrong, and that charity degrades the objects of our pity. 
I could hardly seek to include in this article a satisfactory discus- 
sion of such issues, but I do claim to have shown here that it is only 
if some such objection can be sustained that one may avoid Singer's 
first, strong conclusion: affluent people's not contributing money or 
time to voluntary international aid agencies is immoral, in the same 
way that a bystander's failing to save a drowning child would be 
immoral. 
40. See the works cited in nn. 1, 2. 
41. For the difference between my giving and not giving a sum of money to a 
relief agency is very unlikely to be reflected in someone's death: it will not mean that 
fewer people are fed in the food distribution centers but, rather, that the available food 
will be marginally more thinly spread around. See Whelan, pp. 157-62. 
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Demandingness 
The way in which our argument leads to a problem of demandingness 
is clear. If the claimed analogy between drowning children and starving 
children really does hold, then it will be wrong to donate to aid agencies 
only enough money to feed one child when others are starving too, 
just as it would be to pull one child from the pond and leave others 
to drown. But the further difficulty, of course, is that the number 
of impoverished potential beneficiaries of the lifesaving help of any 
affluent individual is great enough to exhaust all of her resources for 
helping. When am I justified in ceasing to contribute to aid agencies? 
Singer's answer-his second, stronger conclusion-is that non- 
contribution to aid agencies only ceases to be wrong when one has 
reduced oneself to a level such that any further sacrifice would actually 
be worse for those whom one is trying to help.42 Now it may seem 
that the grounds for rejecting this have been furnished above, in the 
form of the claim that considerable personal sacrifice can countervail 
for a morally decent agent against the fact that someone's life is threat- 
ened. However, even if true, this does not obviously leave us far short 
of Singer's stronger conclusion. 
To see this, suppose that $D is a sum which is so considerable 
that if saving someone's life were to cost me $D it would not be wrong 
for me to refrain from doing so. If I continue giving money to interna- 
tional aid agencies, I shall eventually have given away $D. Perhaps 
this sum is sufficient to avert the deaths of a hundred people. The 
problem I now face is, What should I do about the hundred-and-first? 
Having given away $D, I am poorer than I was: maybe now a smaller 
sum, say $D', is the amount my losing which would be a considerable 
enough sacrifice to excuse letting someone die. If our argument is 
correct, it is difficult to see how there could be any relevant question 
for me apart from whether I can save the hundred-and-first person 
for less than $D'. But if so, I will only be permitted to stop giving 
when the cost of saving one further person from starvation is so consid- 
erable to me that there would be nothing wrong with letting a single 
child drown in a pond beside me at that cost. And the cumulative 
sacrifice I will have to have made before I reach that stage will surely 
be huge. 
Thus it does seem that if I continue to give money to aid agencies, 
my aggregate sacrifice will eventually reach a level which would make 
it considerable in relation to a single victim. However, provided the 
42. In "Reconsidering the Famine Relief Argument," pp. 48-49, and Practical 
Ethics, pp. 180-81, Singer claims that we should not advocate such a claim, because it 
would be counterproductive-but he still thinks it is true. Compare Jonathan Glover, 
Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), pp. 109- 10. 
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amount which I must give away to save the next person is not of that 
considerable magnitude, the question is why it is not unkind to be 
unprepared to make that individual sacrifice in favor of him. Why 
should personal sacrifices in favor of other people be considered cumu- 
latively rather than individually? 
This presents us with a problem of demandingness which arises 
independently of an equation of the moral point of view with the 
impartial point of view; and it is a problem which the proponents of 
any plausible moral outlook, theoretical or not, must address. Maybe 
the response to the problem in this form should be the same as one of 
the responses which have been offered to the more familiar version.43 I 
think that it should not, but that the problem does have a solution. 
However, supporting these claims is a much larger task, for another 
occasion. 
43. See n. 5. 
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